I have used John Friedmann’s book as required reading for a master’s degree planning theory course. It was only part of the required reading, and I confess I only used part of the book. Still, he got a lot of play. My comments about the book are based on this experience.

The students read the first and second parts of the book, which survey the various approaches to planning within the framework Friedmann presents. In the course, this followed class sessions on the history of planning where students read a variety of authors and preceded sessions on contemporary practice, ethics, and some attempt to make sense of the whole. I used Friedmann’s book in two ways. First, it provided context and a guide to authors that the students were also required to read (Tugwell, Banfield, Lindblom, Majone, and others). Second, it replaced many other original sources that the students would have read if Friedmann’s book were not available. Before Friedmann, the course relied entirely on a constantly changing collection of articles and chapters. I had to provide framework and context to transform this from a miscellaneous collection to a comprehensible intellectual heritage. After Friedmann, the original articles were reduced by at least a third and the text provided a context. What a relief!

So how useful is his framework for teaching planning theory? This is a different question from “How good is the framework?” If I had to devise my own, it would be different. So, no doubt, would anyone’s. Friedmann’s framework divides planning’s intellectual heritage into four traditions: policy analysis, social learning, social reform, and social mobilization. The sorting of intellectual contributors into these traditions is based on their sharing three things: technical language, philosophical outlook, and central questions. The traditions can also be characterized by their political position on two dimensions: conservative versus radical political orientation, and societal guidance versus social transformation action orientation. Social mobilization stakes out the left, activist position and policy analysis the right.

I have many minor quibbles with the framework and some larger questions. Would it not be reasonable to show a stronger connection between pragmatism and social learning? But as the text makes clear, the story is too complicated to fit neatly in any classification scheme, and cross-classification influences are discussed. The strengths of Friedmann’s framework are that it is catholic, fundamental, and contextual. The coverage is broad, from systems analysts to social anarchists. The original contributors are quoted and discussed, rather than interpreted. The important ideas are presented in the context of the times and events that gave rise to them. This sets Friedmann’s book apart from other planning theory texts, which often take a narrower view of the intellectual heritage of planning and are either too abstract about ideas, ignoring their context, or too practical, as if apologetic for theory.

Some may be critical because the traditional centerpiece of planning theory, the rational planning model, is not featured in Friedmann’s framework. Rationality is discussed under the theme of social reform. Modern public administration and systems analysis, often considered formative ingredients in the model, are discussed under the theme of policy analysis. I think this is an asset. Having students read contemporary statements of the rational planning model within the context of Friedmann’s presentation of the core ideas behind it demystifies the model on its own terms.

One important advantage of using someone else’s framework for organizing the planning theory literature is that there is no compulsion to defend it. One can use it as a pedagogical device. I found this worked well. My criticism of specifics in the framework seemed to free students to think about different ways of assembling the ideas presented. Considering all of this, I conclude that the book is very useful for teaching planning theory; at least part of the book is.

Many students read the third part of the book, where Friedmann lays out his view of the future of planning theory and practice. Perhaps they read it because it was not assigned, thinking I was keeping something from them while promoting my own ideas. They reported, smugly, that they liked it very much. Reading Friedmann’s prescriptions helps answer questions about how he organized the antecedent literature in part two of the book. History, as constructed here, serves to further his argument for the future of planning. That is fair, and I do not think the usefulness of his framework for teaching about planning theory is negatively affected.

Of course, some students were critical of Friedmann’s review of the intellectual heritage of planning. They found parts of it too complex (too many people and interrelated ideas) and parts of it too arduous (not enough context and explanation given their background). Some did not like the writing style. Overall, I think students had a genuine appreciation for the book and benefited from it. John Friedmann has done us a good service with this book. He has provided a useful framework for teaching the literature of planning theory that is both a guide and a foil. Whoever does not like it can give us another. It will get a turn on stage.

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Planning in the Public Domain is the culmination of John Friedmann’s writing on procedural planning theory.
over the last thirty years. In this book Friedmann traces the intellectual history of various ideological traditions in planning over the last two centuries, a theme that can be traced back to an article he co-authored with Barclay Hudson in 1974 (Friedmann and Hudson 1974). Much of what Friedmann has written since then on planning theory has been incorporated in the current volume. For example, the notion of “innovative planning through dialogue,” which Friedmann first developed in his well-known book, Retracking America (1973), appears again. It is now, however, presented as capable of facilitating only “social change” and not “social transformation,” which is Friedmann’s current concern. Similarly, the essence of Friedmann’s relatively less-known book, The Good Society (1979), has been incorporated in his elaboration of the notion of a “political community,” though the current thrust of Friedmann’s thinking on the issue of state-society relationships is more confrontational and polarized than in his earlier writings. There are even traces of Territory and Function (1979) in the last two chapters. There Friedmann restates the importance of territorially bounded communities as vehicles for “social mobilization,” which he now considers to be more important than state-initiated “social reform” for transcending the current crisis of global capitalism.

So Planning in the Public Domain is likely to be useful for planning academicians who may want to introduce their students to Friedmann’s approach to planning theory. I suppose there are very few planning academicians, if any, who will opt not to do so, because the evolution of the field of planning theory is intricately linked with the evolution of Friedmann’s thinking on the subject.

One may disagree with his positions on some issues — I will raise two objections later in the review — but one cannot ignore Friedmann’s scholarship and commitment in legitimizing the field of planning theory. When Friedmann first began to write and teach on the topic some thirty years back, planning theory was not considered a legitimate field of scholarly inquiry even in the leading planning schools in the U.S.; today, it is part of the required core curriculum in most planning schools. Planning in the Public Domain is a symbol of this final victory. Through historical documentation it establishes in a definitive way that much can be learned by understanding two centuries of social thought geared towards influencing the destinies of communities, regions, and nations. In the process, it also provides us, the planners, with a sense of identity, of belonging to a group, and thereby helps us counteract the ambiguity and self-doubt often associated with what Glazer (1974) called the “minor professions.”

This book is timely for at least three other reasons. First, it reemphasizes in no uncertain terms the normative and moral strand within planning thought. At a time such as now, when the bottom line of projects and policies is being increasingly defined in terms of cost-effectiveness only, the stress on the normative component of planning is important for winning the ideological battle over the hearts and minds of planners. Second, the book stresses the notion of a “political community” when the very concept of community as an entity capable of representing collective interest is being challenged by neo-utilitarians under the guise of public choice theory. Third, in defining planning in a very broad way, as application of knowledge to action in the public domain, Friedmann challenges the growing eagerness among some professional planners to draw a firm boundary around themselves — a boundary that will let them bar the entry of nontechnical planners to their exclusive club and thereby strengthen their own legitimacy as professionals. These three emphases — on the normative aspect of planning, its all-inclusive definition, and its communitarian prerequisite — contribute to this book’s overall objective, which is to establish the primacy of “political reason,” as Friedmann calls it, over “technical reason” in planning thought.

It is fair then, I think, to review the content of this book with a political eye. Let us begin by assessing the politics of Friedmann’s categorization of planning thought. Figure 3 (pp. 74-75) lays out in graphic form what Friedmann calls the four major traditions of planning theory. Some 130 names are mentioned here, but not even one person with either an architecture, urban design, or physical planning background is included. Why are these persons not included in the tradition of social reform, when there are at least 150 years of history of public attempts to initiate social reform through reorganization of space and physical environment? Friedmann argues that, “although forms of planning, such as urban design, piecemeal social reforms, and administrative city planning, can be found from the middle of the 19th century, they did not as yet embody a scientific practice. It is only the concept and ideology of a scientifically based planning that will concern us here” (p. 53). Is this true, that planning for rationalization of land use and laying out of infrastructure, mostly by civil engineers, did not embody any scientific practice? What about the first planning program begun at Harvard University in 1923? Was it not created to train students in scientific approaches to city planning?

That raises another issue Friedmann should have considered in the construction of his categories — namely, the history of the institutional home of planning thought. If most planning schools, including UCLA, where Friedmann is based, are administratively attached to schools of architecture, is that not a part of the history that should have been taken into account in explaining the emergence of planning traditions?

Perhaps such an omission is not a major conceptual or methodological problem with this book. But it creates a political problem that may undermine one of Friedmann’s basic objectives in writing this book, which is to provide a sense of meaning, identity, and continuity to a group of people who apply knowledge to action in en-
hancing the quality of life. The exclusion of thousands of urban designers and physical planners in the U.S. and other parts of the world, many with utopian vision and eager for social reform, will not enhance the possibilities for “social transformation” that Friedmann advocates. On the contrary, it will alienate them, making the work of social transformation even more difficult.

There is yet another group of planners who are likely to be alienated by this book: they are the state planners, who, Friedmann argues, address their work to those who are in power and see their primary mission as serving the oppressive state (p. 58). According to Friedmann’s own classification, individuals belonging to the three traditions (out of four) of policy analysis, social learning, and social reform would fall under this category. How accurate is this analysis of the state planner? And what are the likely outcomes of pursuing this line of thinking, if “social mobilization” is to be our objective?

On thinking through these questions, let us look at the mindset of planning students, a majority of whom work for the government after graduation. I believe — and I think Friedmann would agree — these students come to planning schools precisely because they are not content with the status quo, be it related to housing, environmental, or other problems. As they graduate from planning programs and join the government, they become “state actors.” True, many grow disappointed as they recognize the limits of the state’s autonomy from “those in power,” yet do all of them totally surrender their idealism at the feet of those in power? Why characterize them as a homogenous group and portray them as socially insensitive individuals who are against social change? History indicates that these state actors can play a crucial role by joining hands with grassroots-based social groups in bringing about social transformation (Skocpol 1979). Many of them could prove to be allies of the cause Friedmann espouses, but only if their truly limited contribution is respected.

One last word about the state, which Friedmann describes as working hand-in-hand with industrial and finance capital and repressing the forces of social transformation. This orthodox Marxist position is a rather old and somewhat obsolete description of the state. Some current research based on empirical evidence indicates that the reality is far more complex and can hardly be described, as Friedmann describes it, in black and white terms (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Kohli 1987; Toye 1988). These studies suggest that if we are to understand how policies are formed, we must discard the notion of “The State” and look at the policy realm as an ensemble of institutions that are often in conflict with one another. They also suggest that the capitalist state may not be totally subservient to the interests of those who represent national and international capital, a faction of whom have been steadily pushing for the dismantling of the welfare state in recent years. True, some state planners have been eager to help with this dismantling process, but others have resisted (Block et al. 1987). What is more, their resistance has been successful because they have been helped by grassroots groups who have mobilized public opposition against the dismantling of the capitalist state.

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References

In Planning in the Public Domain, Friedmann shoulders a herculean task — both to encompass the intellectual history of planning from the Enlightenment to the present, and to provide a new direction for planning thought and practice in the future. This book, doubtless a landmark in planning theory, brings together in an overarching argument Friedmann’s theoretical work over the past three decades.

After establishing his conception of planning (Part I, “Concepts”), Friedmann reviews and interprets various traditions in planning thought from the Enlightenment to the present (Part II, “Traditions”). In this interpretation of the history of planning thought, which constitutes the main bulk of his essay, Friedmann argues that most traditions adhere to the notion of planning as technical reason, with efficiency as the prime criterion, and where planners are in the service of the state. Friedmann believes that the notion of planning as technical reason is no longer viable given the assaults on the theory of knowledge on which it is based, and the pace of change and the magnitude of the problems we now