Poor Countries’ Students in Rich Countries’ Universities: Possibilities of Planning Education for the Twenty-first Century

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Introduction

The increasing influx of international students into American planning schools has added a new dimension to the ongoing debate about planning education. During the American Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP) conferences in Atlanta (1985), Milwaukee (1986), and Los Angeles (1987), a number of panel discussions were devoted to international planning education. The issue was further discussed during the ACSP meeting in Buffalo (1988).

The questions being raised about the increasing enrollment of foreign students in planning schools are very similar to those raised during the 1960s about increased foreign student enrollment in other professional schools in U.S. universities. For example: Are foreign students properly selected and screened? Are they coming to the U.S. at the proper level of their educational development? Is their command of the English language sufficient? Are universities adjusting their academic standards in evaluating the foreign students' performance? Are these students taking resources away from American students? Are the American taxpayers subsidizing the education of international students? (See IIE 1981; Scully 1980; Spaulding and Flack 1976.) Though all of these questions deserve attention, they are not the focus of this paper.

I want to raise another question instead: Is the education offered in U.S. planning schools relevant for students from low-income countries? This is not a new question. Charles Abrams first raised it in 1964; since then, others have raised the same question intermittently (Wheaton 1968; Friedmann 1973a; Fisher 1981; Hansen 1985; Qadeer 1984). My purpose in reopening the question of relevance in planning education is, however, different from those of my predecessors. I want to interject some fresh thinking on this issue based on a very different understanding of the world we inhabit, the times in which we live, and the future for which we are prepar-

Abstract

Relevant planning education must take into account that we live in one world comprised of rich and poor nations who are now faced with a common crisis of economy and of ideas. The central purpose of contemporary planning education should be to sensitize students to the global dimension of this crisis and to build a consensus of ideas about ways of transcending it. This requires that North American and international students be brought together to learn to “think globally” and yet “act locally” in searching for solutions to the crisis. Such a joint search requires an intellectual environment of mutual learning; and that, in turn, requires a change in the ethnocentric and tempocentric biases of North American planning academia.

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ing the students of today. Let me elaborate this point by a very brief summary of why the question of relevance was raised in the past.

Abrams’ (1964) intention in raising the question was to mobilize funding for starting a university in Turkey. This was not because he felt U.S. education was irrelevant for Turkish students, but because he wanted to introduce the U.S. style of education in Turkey and also contribute to institution building, both of which he considered essential for Turkey’s development. Wheaton (1968) raised the relevancy issue for a totally different reason. He was worried that the education of students from poor countries was contributing to immigration, because these students, once exposed to Western affluence, were reluctant to return to their countries. To counteract this, Wheaton proposed that these students be provided monetary incentives to return to their countries.

Hansen’s (1985) more recent argument is similar to Wheaton’s in the sense that he too is concerned about foreign students living in the U.S. after graduation. Hansen argues that if foreign students are trained in American planning practices, they are more likely to stay in the U.S. because of employment possibilities. Hence, he proposes that they be taught foreign planning practices, which will make them unattractive to American employers and thereby also stop the “brain drain” from poor to rich countries.

That foreign students should be trained in planning practices more appropriate for their countries of origin has been stressed by others, though for different reasons. For example, Friedmann (1973a) and Fisher (1981) have argued that foreign students who return to their countries after graduation often feel a deep sense of frustration at not being able to utilize their training abroad. Their education in the U.S. almost invariably contributes to “trained incompetence,” wrote Friedmann (1986), because of the wide differences in the institutional contexts and in socioeconomic priorities between the U.S. and the poor countries. This point of view has been stressed lately by Third World planning academicians, including some who teach in Western planning schools (Qadeer 1984; Banerjee 1985).

International agencies which in the past funded the study of poor countries’ students in Western planning schools have also begun to take this view into account in their funding policies. Hence, it is quite common to hear these days that planning education for the poor countries’ students should be provided by the poor countries’ universities, with some assistance from universities abroad if required (Kunzmann 1985; Rodwin 1986; The Center for Human Settlements 1984). Some have even argued that there are already a number of good planning programs in the poor countries, but their students continue to be admitted to U.S. planning schools to counteract the decline of American student enrollment (Qadeer 1986).

In responding to these concerns and criticisms, American planning schools have pursued two approaches so far. The first and more prevalent approach has been to continue with the same set of courses for both the American and foreign students, with one or two new ad hoc courses on Third World planning added to the curriculum. Usually, the small and medium-sized planning schools have followed this approach, partly because they lack the resources to offer any more courses, partly because they believe that the poor countries’ students should be taking American planning courses because they come to the U.S to learn from the American experience. Implicit in this approach is a rather traditional and somewhat colonial notion: that the purpose of American planning education for foreign students is to transfer know-how from the U.S., where there is plenty, to the poor nations, where it is lacking. The vision of the world that shapes this charitable notion of education is that all countries are moving along the Rostowian “S” curve of development, and that the countries at the bottom of the curve should pattern themselves after the ones at the top, if that is where they eventually want to be.

The second approach to planning education of poor countries’ students is quite different in orientation. Organized in terms of a specialized degree program, commonly titled a Master of Planning in Developing Areas, this approach emerged during the mid-1970s in response to the sort of criticisms referred to earlier. Lately it has been incorporated in the curricula of some of the leading American planning programs. The central assumption of this approach is that the planning problems and contexts of the poor nations are so very different from those of the U.S. that the students from these countries should be trained in a very different way, with a different body of knowledge based on the institutional specificities of these countries.

The objective of this paper is to introduce yet another alternative mode of thinking about the education of poor countries’ students in American planning schools. My purpose is not to deny the kinds of concerns that led to the creation of special programs on poor countries, but to interject a new approach to the issue based on an even broader concern about the very purpose of planning education in the late twentieth century. I begin with the assumption, which I think is correct, that poor countries’ students will continue to come to the American planning schools for some time; and I propose that instead of thinking of it as a problem, American planning schools should consider it an opportunity for enhancing the relevancy of education for all planning students — foreign as well as domestic.

Why so? I argue that to be relevant, planning education, whether in the U.S. or elsewhere, must take into account the current global reality. We must acknowledge that in the late twentieth century we live in one world, not three or four separate worlds, as terms such as Third World or Fourth World imply; and that this world
comprises rich and poor nations that are increasingly linked through ownership, commodity trade, technological and financial relationships, and transnational movements of students. Contemporary capitalism, which is a cause as well as an effect of these linkages, poses a major challenge now to both the rich and poor nations who are faced with a "common crisis" (The Brandt Commission 1983). Our challenge is the following: Can we transcend the crisis through progressive and democratic reform of contemporary capitalism? I emphasize progressive and democratic because there are indications in both rich and poor countries of regressive responses that are parochial, undemocratic, and repressive, that threaten our collective survival in the long run instead of strengthening its possibilities.

The central purpose of contemporary planning education should be to face this challenge boldly. And, in this regard, American planning schools can play a significant role precisely because they attract large numbers of international students. These students, if properly guided, can serve as a major resource both in the understanding of the global dimension of the current crisis and in building a consensus of ideas about ways of transcending it. This will require that the American and poor countries' students be brought together, instead of being separated into "special programs," as is the current trend. Together, these students should be sensitized to the common crisis and provided an intellectual framework to "think globally" and yet "act locally" in searching for solutions. To be effective, such a joint search will require an intellectual environment of mutual learning for American and international students; and that, in turn, will require a change in the ethnocentric and teleological biases of American planning academia.

In proposing this alternative vision of planning education, I have organized this paper into five parts and an epilogue. The first two parts, which are historical, trace the intellectual origins of the two approaches American planning schools have pursued so far in addressing the educational needs of poor countries' students. This is followed by a review of the current intellectual turmoil within American planning academia and its need to come to terms with the common crisis of economy and of ideas. The fourth part elaborates on an alternative vision of planning education for transcending the common crisis. To support my proposal, I have provided evidence of mutual learning among planning academicians and of transfer of experience in problem solving from poor to rich countries. The epilogue presents some key operational issues which must be dealt with in making a transition to the new mode of planning education.

Those Were the Days

Not so long ago, students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America were admitted to American planning schools to learn things the Western way. Both the teachers and the students were convinced that this was a good thing to do. The students wanted to learn about industrialization and urbanization from the American experience. The American universities felt that they had something indispensable to offer to those who had the misfortune to be born into poor, agrarian countries that were striving to develop. Development meant accelerated industrialization, urbanization, and increasing consumption, much like what the Western countries had achieved. And to develop, the poor countries had to traverse the same path as the rich countries; that is what the substantive theories in the field of economic development proposed (Rostow 1971). To aid in the process, Western nations were regarded as providers of both financial and technical assistance, including higher education, to the poor nations.

The then dominant sociological theories further reinforced the economists' claim that the poor nations had to transform themselves by shedding their traditional values and developing an outlook similar to that of the "Western economic man." Talcot Parsons' (1951) writings on the role of individuals in modern, industrialized societies provided the theoretical rationale in a definitive way. The message was clear. To be part of a modern, industrial society, individuals could no longer be bound to the irrational, communal arrangements that had been the hallmark of traditional societies. Industrialization and modernization require a new type of person: relatively autonomous, dedicated to economic maximization and self-fulfillment, and comfortable with the contractual relationships required of efficient market operations. Education was to serve as the primary mechanism for initiating such changes in values. Once these cultural changes were accomplished, economic development would flourish, the sociologists claimed (Hoselitz 1952; McClelland 1961). Thus, the benefits of educating poor countries' students in Western universities were seen as twofold: the transfer of both technical knowledge and a cultural ethos appropriate for initiating and fostering modernization.

This general consensus about socioeconomic transformation embodied a consensus about the role of government in the process. The need for planning of national economies and cities was considered vital by development planners around the world. The legitimacy of planning was, in part, a result of four previously successful planning ventures in the industrialized countries; namely, postrevolution central planning in Russia; planning during the Depression in Western countries; sectoral planning during World War II; and the role of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe (Meier 1984). The birth of the discipline of Development Economics in the early 1950s had also strengthened the claims for public planning (Hirschman 1981). The conventional wisdom then was that planning was required for "rational" allocation of scarce resources among the various sectors of the economy. The planners would de-
cide on a growth rate of GNP, calculate the resources required for attaining this growth rate, show the gap between resources required and those available internally, and finally make an "objective" plea for foreign aid. This process — at least on paper — seemed quite similar to what is known as the "rational planning model" in American procedural planning theory: it assumed a consensus of goals; it attempted to be comprehensive, covering all sectors of the economy; and it stressed rationality and objectivity in decision making by the use of "scientific" techniques, such as input/output analysis, dynamic programming and simulation of growth models.

At the level of city planning, the conventional wisdom then was also to emulate the Western model. It was believed that national development through industrialization required the emergence of a spatial system of cities whose sizes would follow a log-normal distribution, as in the already developed countries (Berry 1971; El-Shakhs 1972). This was to be achieved by depopulating the rural areas, where more than 80 percent of the people lived (Lewin 1955). The aim was to transfer the "irrational and disguisedly unemployed peasants" to the city, where they could then be turned into a rational work force for the emerging industries. To house the industries, the workers, and the commercial activities, efficient and modern cities were required. That meant an efficient land use pattern with clearly demarcated areas for each type of activity, connected by transportation arteries. Thus, the use of a master city plan, which was then popular in the Western countries, was thought to be appropriate for the poor countries as well. The master plans provided a mechanism for the poor nations to visually articulate their grandiose visions of development. Aided by foreign consultants, virtually all major cities in these countries produced elaborate land use maps. According to these maps, the existing land uses which defied clear demarcation of activities had to be drastically altered to achieve a rational organization of space. Major alterations were also recommended to make way for the construction of massive highways — another feature that was borrowed from American cities. These highways were particularly appropriate elements in fostering a "modern" image. As for the city centers, where traditional bazaars and all sorts of housing had previously existed side by side, the master plans recommended the construction of luxury hotels and large-scale government public buildings to house the national and international "agents of development." To facilitate such a process of transformation, students from the poor countries logically chose to come to the Western universities for advanced degrees in architecture and urban planning (Banerjee 1985).

The American planning schools responded to the aspirations of foreign students rather well, despite offering not even a single course on the specialized problems of poor countries. It is interesting to note that during the same time, the economics departments in some of the leading U.S. universities had begun to offer development economics as a specialization in the economic problems of poor countries. Though the planning schools lacked any such specialization, they provided an intellectual environment that may have been more conducive to the foreign students' aspirations — to develop through planning — than anything offered by the economics departments. One explanation for this apparent paradox is that in American universities, planning departments have always been relatively more receptive to the notion of planning than the economics departments, where the concept of a "planned economy" is deeply disliked (Alonso 1986). This is very much a product of the American tradition whereby public planning, to the extent it is accepted, is confined to the local level (Dyckman 1978). During the 1950s, American planning schools incorporated within this tradition the aspirations of prospective planners from the poor countries. Together, the American and the international students dreamed of turning the world into a vast technological landscape, undeterred by either scarcity of resources or social conflicts. They both believed that rational planning, based on scientific principles and aided by advanced technology in problem solving, would help them achieve their objective. This consensus about the goals of development as well as about planning procedures contributed to the common understanding that there was only one way — the Western way — to plan and develop. These were times when the three largest planning schools in the U.S. — MIT, the University of North Carolina, and the University of California at Berkeley — had no course offerings in developing areas planning (Nocks 1974). There was no need to offer such courses.

### Paradise Lost

The consensus about what the international students should be taught in U.S. planning schools began to collapse by the end of the 1960s. Two trends, one at the international level and the other within the U.S., contributed to its rapid erosion. At the international level, with the publication of Dudley Seers' seminal 1969 article, "What Is Development?" a growing dissent began among development specialists about the appropriateness of the Western growth model for the poor countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This coincided with the growing dissatisfaction among American planners with the rational planning model, which had been ineffective in dealing with the problems of inner-city poverty and urban riots. Together, these two trends shattered the optimism of the previous decade. By the beginning of the 1970s, American planning academia was marked by major disagreements about what to teach not only the international students, but also the domestic students.

The disagreement about the training of international
students was sparked by a new perception that their needs were quite different from those of the domestic students. This new awareness was largely a result of the disillusionment with the development process of the poor nations, who, it had been assumed until then, would generally follow the Western route to socioeconomic development. The disillusionment was on two fronts. In terms of economics, there was a growing pessimism that the poor nations had been unable to create a broad base of prosperity despite significant increases in their GNP growth rates (Prebisch 1979). As evidence, the critics pointed out the large and increasing urban unemployment, squatter housing, and deepening income inequality in all but a few countries. The political trends in these countries were even more disappointing. Contrary to the expectation that capitalist development would ease social tension and facilitate political democracy, the army had come to rule in many of the poor nations, which were marked by socioeconomic and cultural polarization and accentuated conflict. These trends deeply troubled liberal Americans who had played a leading role after World War II in expanding American university education for the international students (Packenham 1973). There emerged a growing sentiment that perhaps the Western experience of development could not serve as a model for the poor countries and that the training of planners for these countries must necessarily be responsive to the very different socioeconomic and institutional characteristics of those countries (Zetter 1981; Brine 1972). The difference between the poor and the rich countries received the highest attention in neo-Marxist criticism, which by the early 1970s had emerged as a strong contender to orthodox development theory. The principal targets of the neo-Marxist criticism were the notions that the poor and the rich nations were tied by a mutually beneficial relationship, and that the poor nations would eventually industrialize in much the same way as the rich nations. The neo-Marxists argued that, in reality, the rich and poor nations were tied by a mechanism of “unequal exchange,” which created dependency of the poor nations on the rich, “underdeveloped” the poor nations’ economies, and transferred surplus to the rich countries (Amin 1977; Frank 1969). To retain this global system of unequal exchange, a cadre of global managers was required, the Marxists argued; and they criticized the universities in the rich countries for catering to that need (Gorg 1976). In other words, the neo-Marxists saw the role of Western universities as harmful to the interests of poor nations, whose best students, the Marxists argued, were being co-opted to join the group of global managers to protect the inherently unfair global capitalist system.

The “We Are Different” Mentality
What emerged from this criticism and disillusionment was an image of the world very different from that which characterized developmental thinking in the early 1950s. In sharp contrast to the earlier view that rich and poor nations traversed the same path of development, these nations were now perceived only in terms of their most acute differences. Such conceptual categories as “North/South,” the “core/periphery,” and “the haves/have nots” implied a dichotomous world with conflicting interests between the rich and the poor countries. The internal problems faced by these governments and their respective capacities to respond were also perceived to be qualitatively different. Implicit in this new understanding was the belief that the solutions to the poor countries’ problems, both economic and political, would be rather different from the historical experiences of the rich countries in comparable stages of their development. Much of this type of observation was actually made by development experts and area specialists from the rich countries who had traveled, without much experience, to the poor nations at the beginning of the 1950s and were now returning to their own countries after years of field experience (Sutton 1982). The elite of the poor countries, who participated in numerous international conferences and interacted closely with international aid agencies, also subscribed to this “we are different” approach, though many of these elite had, by then, been deeply influenced by their association, both academic and official, with the rich nations.

One aspect that stands out in this reversal of attitude, from “we are the same” to “we are different” was the interpretation of the role of the culture in modernization. As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the 1950s, cultural change was considered a crucial prerequisite for initiating economic development in the poor countries. Some may recall the disparaging remarks about the “irrational small peasants” who were believed to defy any modernization attempts. It was believed that modernization would require a change of work ethic, more individualism, and less communal bonding among the emerging working class of the poor nations. Interestingly enough, by the late 1960s, the interpretation of cultural differences had made a complete turnaround. Cultural norms of the poor nations were no longer considered a hindrance to development. On the contrary, as Schumacher (1973) and others advocated, the local culture was now to be considered an asset in fostering “self-sustaining development.” In the process, the “irrational peasant” of the 1950s became the “rational small farmer,” who was now believed to have a deep understanding of the local constraints and possibilities in relation to modernization. This made him look uniquely appropriate for locally based development. What is more, individualism of the Western kind, which only a decade back was hailed as crucial in fostering modernization and progress, was now deplored for social fragmentation of the advanced societies (Marcuse 1964; Hampden-Turner 1971). It became popular to argue that Western individualism did not lead to social progress but to an-
omie and alienation; and the poor nations were advised to resist the penetration of this negative trait that formed the core of cultural imperialism (von Lane 1987).

This new approach to development, more sympathetic to the particularities of the poor nations and less accepting of the general Western model, began to be incorporated in the curriculum of U.S. planning schools by the mid-1970s. Some planning schools began offering an ad hoc course on “Third World planning.” Typically, such a course focused on the problems of squatter housing or on urban informal sector employment, and catered to the needs of international students, an increasing number of whom then came from the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. The larger planning schools began offering more than one course on Third World planning. A popular course, I remember, was one entitled “Alternative Theories of Development.” Under this broad and somewhat ambiguous title, the course provided a variety of criticisms of the Western development paradigm. This ranged from the Schumacherian “small is beautiful” type of analysis to Streeten’s (1981) “basic needs” approach to neo-Marxian structural criticisms of capitalist development. None of these different strands of criticism, however, could provide a really coherent alternative model that could restore the lost consensus about how the poor nations were to develop. They only strengthened the newly popular notion that the rich and the poor nations were totally different in all aspects.

- The American Front

Let us leave aside for a moment the problems of lost consensus about Third World development and focus instead on a simultaneous loss of consensus on another front that had severely affected American planning academia by the early 1970s. As is well recognized by now, the notions and principles that had shaped American urban planning doctrines since World War II began to be seriously questioned in the aftermath of the urban riots in the mid-1960s (Friedmann 1973b; Rittel and Webber 1973; Godchalk 1974). Prior to the riots, American urban planners had been preoccupied with postwar affluence. Many had defined their task mainly in terms of construction of large-scale land use and transportation models which, they believed, helped in the “rational allocation of resources.” These were times of growth and prosperity, of large-scale suburbanization and federal highway construction (Krueckeberg 1983). Planning was then considered primarily a technical process: a process of resource optimization to achieve accepted social objectives. Economic growth dominated all thinking; and it was the common wisdom that the impact of growth was beneficial for all Americans. This, we may recall, was very similar to the developmental thinking of the time. While the development planners spent much of their time constructing national growth models, hoping that growth once achieved would trickle down the social hi-

archy. American urban planners created elaborate models of urban land use and transportation with similar convictions about their impact on social groups.

The urban riots had challenged this technocratic and optimistic vision of American urban planners and rudely awakened planners to the depressing reality of poverty and social conflict in a country where increasing affluence and social consensus were virtually taken for granted. As Daniel Bell (1968, 168) wrote about the times, “when the poverty issue arose, nobody was really prepared, nobody had any data, nobody knew what to do.” In a way this is surprising, because the 1960s were not the first time in the history of twentieth-century America that issues of poverty and unemployment had gripped the country. The Depression had significantly affected America’s social legislation and had inadvertently ushered in a decade of planning efforts (Skocpol and Finegold 1982). But in the post–World War II euphoria of growth and optimism, American planners had begun to believe that poverty would eventually simply wither away (Patterson 1981). To be sure, there were a few skeptics, like Galbraith (1958) and Michael Harrington (1962); but they were lone voices whose structural criticisms of the American economy were ignored until the American cities had burst into flames in the mid-1960s.

The American urban planner’s response to the urban riots, and later to the presidential call for “War on Poverty,” was ineffective — both the academic and practicing planners acknowledge that. What is more pertinent, however, is that there is no consensus as yet among American planners about how to be effective at such times. This is true despite much discussion during the last two decades about many planning approaches — ranging from advocacy to “guerillas within bureaucracy” to the “transactive style” — which were proposed as alternatives to the much discredited rational comprehensive model. At first, this lack of consensus was actually quite fruitful in generating a lively debate within the planning profession. Nonetheless, as the debate continued for years — and still continues — without any sign of resolution, a sense of crisis has begun to pervade all thinking within the field (de Neufville 1986; Alexander 1984).

- What Now?

If there is no consensus either about how to develop the poor nations, or how to plan American cities, can American planning schools claim — as they did with such self-assurance during the 1950s — that the purpose of educating international students is to transfer know-how from the U.S., which has plenty, to the poor nations, where it is lacking? When American urban planners themselves seem to be at a loss in the face of sluggish economic growth, plant closures, capital flight, increasing homelessness, and decreasing concern at the federal
level about cities, what kind of accumulated knowledge about planning can they pass on to the prospective planners from the poor countries? The American planning schools need to formulate a coherent response to these questions.

One type of response I have heard in academic meetings is that U.S. planning schools should no longer be in the business of educating students from poor countries. This is more a principle-oriented position than a pragmatic one. International students are likely to continue to come to the U.S. for various reasons, not the least of which may be to learn the "how to" of development planning (Fisher 1981). This, some argue, is a good reason to offer "special programs" in developing country planning, since neither the success nor the failure of U.S. planning experience is relevant for the poor countries. At first hearing, this line of argument may seem less arrogant and more convincing than the traditional notion that international students should learn things the Western way. There is, however, an ethnocentric attitude implicit in this proposition too. Why? Because it is based on the assumption that the poor countries' students come to the U.S. planning schools to learn about the "specificities" of the problems back home. This is a wrong assumption (Dandekar 1984). Further, it also wrongly assumes that the poor countries' problems are invariably different from the American problems: that they are more severe, are often structural (as opposed to cyclical), and must be responded to in an institutional environment that is chronically unstable. Yet, there is also an underlying belief that American planning schools can help the poor nations' students to better understand that very different social reality. Why that may be so, particularly when the U.S. planners do not seem to be able to comprehend their own problems, remains unanswered.

That, however, does not seem to bother American planning academia. Staffed by faculty members, most of whom are the product of an arrogant era in development thinking — an era of Western experts, advisors, and modern techniques — American planning academia seems to take it for granted that planning education must necessarily be a one-way street where knowledge is to follow from the rich to the poor nations, where the vision of progress of humankind is to be unidirectional, always to be led by the world's rich nations. There are, of course, some exceptional individuals in U.S. planning academia who never contributed to this ethnocentric approach; this paper will refer to their work. Nevertheless, in general, this attitude is so prevalent that its conceptual underpinnings are regarded virtually as common sense. After all, what could American planners possibly learn from Bangladesh's or Zambia's planning experience? Are not the contexts widely different, with America far ahead in the development trajectory?

The answers to these questions are not obvious — at least not anymore. As we begin to enter the last decade of the twentieth century, the rich and the poor nations seem to be confronted by a common crisis, admittedly with different response capacities (The Brandt Commission 1983; Helleiner 1980). It is not within the scope of this paper to dwell at length on the nature of this common crisis, which is widely recognized by now, thanks to the research efforts of many scholars from the rich as well as poor countries (Fishlow et al. 1980; Green 1983; Cardoso 1980). For our purpose, it is important to recognize that the economies of both the rich and the poor nations are in serious trouble and that this is not coincidental. Rather, the common problems have emerged from a growing connection between these nations in a global system of production and consumption based on ownership, commodity trade, and technological and financial links (Bienfeld and Godfrey 1982). The common economic problem has challenged the conventional wisdom that while the poor nations must transcend structural barriers to achieve economic growth, the rich nations can ensure steady growth by neutralizing periodic cyclical fluctuations of the economy through Keynesian policies. The current crisis shows that both the rich and poor nations are confronted with structural problems of readjustment to a global economy over which neither seems to have much control (Seers 1979). As a result, the old discussion about "industrialization" of the poor nations and the new concern for "reindustrialization" of the rich nations have begun to sound similar. We now acknowledge that the most technologically advanced nations can also be hurt by the strains of absorbing modern technology. We have also come to acknowledge that there is no certainty that an acceleration of growth per se will be a solution to social problems, such as unemployment, either in the rich or poor nations (Seers 1979; Bluestone and Harrison 1982).

The current economic problems have affected the political process in both the rich and poor nations. There is some similarity between them in that aspect, too. In both contexts, the state seems to be confronted by a deepening fiscal crisis which, in turn, has contributed to its growing legitimation crisis (O'Connor 1987; Castells 1980; Harrison 1981). Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to dwell at length on this issue. For now, we must recognize this adverse trend, which has major implications for our thinking about the role of the state in capitalist societies. It was not that long ago when the Western model of the welfare state was held up as the symbol of political democracy to the rest of the world. Now the notion of the welfare state seems to be under attack even in the richest of the rich countries in the world (Offe 1987; Gough 1979). The reality is that in both the rich and poor countries, the state is confronted by increasing claims on its rather limited and, in some cases, declining resources; and in both cases it lacks control over the fluctuations in the global economy, yet must respond to the social problems that such fluctuations create.
The implications of these macro trends for urban problems in both the rich and poor nations came under discussion in planning literature only a few years back (Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Smith and Reagin 1987). From our limited understanding so far, the problems facing urban planners in the rich and poor countries now appear somewhat similar. Unemployment and underemployment are no longer perceived as structural problems in the poor nations and cyclical — and hence temporary — problems in the rich nations. Now it seems that 8 to 10 percent of the urban labor force in even the rich nations cannot be employed at any time (Summers 1988; Offe 1985). Hawkers and peddlers are no longer the problem of only poor countries’ cities. Now, the merchants of Fifth Avenue in Manhattan want the hawkers to be removed from the city’s streets13 (New York Times, 19 December 1986 B1). Squatter housing and homeless people — the two virtually permanent features of poor countries’ cities — have begun to appear in the rich countries too (Radburn and Buss 1986; Erickson and Wilhelm 1986). Remember the demolition of squatter housing in poor countries that was so forcefully argued against by John Turner (1965) in the 1960s? In 1987, the Los Angeles Police Chief was involved in precisely that in his city’s skid row area (Los Angeles Times, 3 March 1987). One cannot dismiss these observations as isolated incidents that occur occasionally only in Los Angeles or New York. The recent reports of the National Urban Coalition, as well as the National League of Cities, indicate a distinct trend in that direction nationwide (New York Times, 24 May 1987 18; 30 June 1987 A21).

The Planners’ Response

What should be the role of planning under these new circumstances — with growing problems and dwindling state resources? It is disheartening to realize that the planners in neither the rich nor the poor nations have an adequate and coherent response to this fundamental question.12 In most cases, they have adopted policies proposed by others (i.e., bankers, real estate interest groups, or conservative politicians); in a few cases, they have resisted such policies, but without proposing an alternative agenda of their own. This lack of initiatives on the part of planners is another sign of the current crisis. It is a crisis of ideas, of the irrelevancy of the dominant theories and conceptual framework through which the social and political processes used to be understood during a very different time (Cooper 1983; Daves 1984). This is true for both the rich and poor nations. In both contexts — in the countries where these theories and concepts were initially formulated and in those to which they were exported — the old models of development and planning have become dysfunctional. As a result, the planning profession all over the world seems to be in disarray. What is even more disconcerting is that in the name of pragmatism, planners in increas-

ing numbers are abandoning their traditional resolve to be normative in their outlook. They have ceased to be the source of inspiration and ideas about what might be and what ought to be (Isserman 1985).

This loss of vision and confidence is a serious professional deficiency, particularly now, when planning is under attack from both the right and left of the ideological spectrum (Dyckman 1987). The primary thrust of these criticisms has been about the nature of the state in capitalist countries. Neither the right nor the left seems to believe — though for different reasons — that the state has the relative autonomy to initiate major reforms in counteracting the current crisis. In other words, the state’s ability to plan is being questioned. The left’s position on this issue is not new. Since the 1960s, it has consistently argued that the state in capitalist countries is controlled by the dominant classes and hence primarily serves their interests.15 Thus, the state is unable to initiate major changes that will significantly alter the control of these groups over either the economy or the polity (Harvey 1978; Hirsch 1978). In contrast, the right’s position is relatively new. Couched in terms of public choice theory, it argues that the current crisis is the result of wrong state policies — policies that were formulated by the state actors primarily to enhance their own interests (Bates 1987; Coleman 1986). According to this view, the state actors (planners and bureaucrats) use their privileged position in the policy-making process and seek “rents” from individuals who are then provided access to influence the policy outcomes. Thus, the state does not really have the autonomy to pursue “correct policies” that would require less state involvement in the economy, because that would never be agreed to by the state actors.

Faced with this double criticism from the right and the left, planners all over the world have been on the defensive. So far, our responses to criticisms of the basic premise of our profession have been fragmented and reactive. Lacking a coherent conceptual framework, we are increasingly incapable of formulating an argument for public planning in capitalist societies. We have neither a clear understanding about our relative autonomy for initiating progressive reforms nor a well-thought-out agenda for determining what these reforms should be. As a result, common people in rich and poor countries alike are becoming skeptical about whether public planning can be useful in the current crisis.

Large Commitments for Large Objectives

What kind of planning education is relevant under these circumstances? How can we best prepare our students — both American and international — to function effectively amidst the current crisis? What should we teach them so they can shape the future in a democratic and progressive way?

To begin with, we need to sensitize all our students to
the common crisis that confronts us. That means not only making them understand the nature of the current problems, but also sensitizing them to the current conceptual inadequacies for seeking solutions. One has to be very careful, however, not to immobilize the students with a critical perspective based on the structural inevitabilities of the crisis and of the conflicts that are bound to follow. Just the opposite is needed: we must help the students to identify what to hold onto amidst the confusion. This is a very difficult task. On one hand, to make the students concerned about the current trends, we must shatter their complacency. Yet, on the other hand, we must help them reconstruct a new meaning for their role as planners, drawing from the very past they must now transcend.

One way this dual task can be performed is by bringing American and international students together. The nature of the current crisis is such that to understand its origin, as well as its implications, a joint scrutiny by both groups of students may be most illuminating. Aside from opening their minds to the linkages of the problems, a joint scrutiny is likely to generate an interest in historical analysis, which is the only way to understand how such linkages have developed over time. This will counteract the now prevalent bias of tempocentrism in problem definition among planning students.14 They may then better appreciate that the world has changed over time, that there are reasons why such change came about, and that in the late twentieth century, the rich and poor nations have become linked as never before.

Sensitizing students to the common crisis, however, is not sufficient. We in professional programs have to provide our students with a set of tools for thinking about solutions. This is not a simple task of teaching them various techniques and "hard skills." Lacking a clear conception of what kind of knowledge is essential for the students under the current circumstances, how are we to know which techniques to teach (Schon and Nutt 1974)? Perhaps the most appropriate thing we can do is to encourage students to critically evaluate some of the key notions of "solutions" that have guided our thinking in the past. At least one such notion comes to mind immediately: that of modernization. Many of the post–World War II development policies have been guided by this key notion, which provided us a set of very specific goals related not only to economics but also to politics, social arrangements, and cultural practices. We are no longer sure about the relevance of these goals for either poor or rich nations, yet neither have we been able to reconstruct a set of new goals. Our inability to think afresh, even with all sorts of technological innovations, is in part due to our reluctance to let go of our old methods of thinking, which were also shaped by a set of key notions such as rationality, positivism, and efficiency. The validity of these concepts must be questioned as well in light of the current crisis confronting the poor and rich nations. It is through reinterpretation of these key notions, I believe, that new approaches to development and planning will eventually emerge.

To be successful, reinterpretation of development objectives must be based on analysis of current problems and discussion of reforms required to solve specific problems. This, too, can be done better by bringing the American and international students together. In fact, they must be brought together if we truly want to encourage them to think about reforms in a pragmatic way. Why so? Because the nature of the current problem is such that the solutions require reform in both domestic and international contexts simultaneously. Felix Rohatyn (1987) first explained this new requirement for problem solving from the American side. Since then, more and more planners and economists have come to the same conclusion. What this implies for planning education is that from now on our students must be trained to think about reform in a dialectical way, taking into account both domestic and international contexts and how reform in one cannot be successful without reform in the other.

Perhaps a brief remark about international reforms is appropriate here. We may recall that major international reforms about trade, monetary arrangements, and development assistance were made in 1944 as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference. Then, most of the poor countries were under colonial rule and were not represented in the conference; and the nineteen poor countries that did participate were merely observers, rather than active participants in the conference (Mogggridge 1980). They had signed an accord which for all purposes was really an Anglo-American deal (Gardner 1969). John Maynard Keynes had objected to even this minimalistic participation by poor countries on the grounds that they would turn the conference into "monkey-business" (Mogggridge 1980, 42). He obviously had no conception of the important role the poor countries would play in the global economy within the next twenty years. Now, as we approach the beginning of the twenty-first century, these nations must be heard from and their claims must be taken into account if global capitalism is to transcend the current crisis (Helleiner 1984). This is not going to be an easy task. As Strange (1984) describes, the current relationship between rich and poor countries is like that of two people in a Harold Pinter play, who sit facing each other but talk past one another, repeating to themselves for their own satisfaction the words they have already spoken to each other countless times. The reconstruction of consensus at the global level requires an end to this unproductive process. The rich and poor nations must now begin to talk with one another, rather than at each other, as they typically do in international forums.

Consensus Building

The road to consensus building through dialogue may as well begin in the American planning schools. In fact, the
American planning schools may be the best place to begin because they offer the most conducive intellectual environment for questioning basic conceptual categories that shaped our thinking about development and planning for most of the twentieth century. Unlike economics departments, where such notions as competition, growth, or modernization are accepted as "the truth," the planning schools have a history of questioning such social constructs. Also, planning schools are much more willing to acknowledge conflicts of interest and goals as part and parcel of social reality that must be responded to for consensus building. This is because planners deal with actual problems that usually involve conflicts, be they at the community, city, or regional levels; and that makes them skeptical of the simplistic, conflict-free models of social reality with which economists usually work.

Thus, consensus building about new reforms must necessarily begin with explicit recognition of the current conflicts of interest between communities, regions, and nations. Yet, at the same time, we must emphasize the commonality of their interests in the late twentieth century. For the students of poor and rich nations, this will require a frank exchange of views about their countries' specific problems. A discussion of this sort, if properly guided, will make the students understand the general process of capitalist development, of which both types of countries are part, the specific role played by each type of country in that process, and the particular outcome of this process in any given place, as conditioned by the institutional arrangements of that place. For example, a discussion about the problems of increasing urban unemployment in both the rich and poor countries can help students understand the extent to which what appear to be strictly local problems may be caused not only by the general slowing down of the global economy or its restructuring, but also by local factors, such as over-valued exchange rates, wage rates, or fiscal deficits. Such an exercise will help the students to transcend the rather crude conceptions of the world's nations and their problems as either all the same or totally different. It will cultivate their minds to appreciate the more complex reality of the extent to which their countries may be similar to, and yet different from, other countries. This view of the world will help the students sort out the potential for conflict as well as cooperation among the various countries in the world.

Another way in which we can sensitize students to the common crisis is to select some specific issues — the sort that Helleiner (1979) and Seers (1979) have called "interface" issues — and help the students understand the domestic determinants of external economic relationships and the external determinants of domestic economic problems. For example, the students may be asked to discuss the impact of American budget deficits on the balance of payment of poor countries. Or, they may discuss the implications of the debt problems of poor nations for America's banking regulations. If these types of issues seem "too macro" for urban planners, we may need to probe other interface issues, such as the impact of the large influx of foreign capital on real estate development in American cities. Specifically, we may discuss the impact on land or housing prices and on housing rents. Or the students may discuss the impact of immigration from Central American countries on the labor market in large American cities, such as New York or Los Angeles (Sassen 1985). Conversely, they could analyze the impact of plant transfers from American cities to developing countries (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Another issue that cuts across national boundaries is environmental problems of the type created by the Bhopal accident in India. Who is to be held accountable for such an incident? What are its implications for future conflict or cooperation among the rich and poor nations? Such questions will sensitize students to global linkages, help them to identify the potential for conflict and cooperation that emerges from such linkages, and encourage them to think about the types of reform that may be necessary to meet the challenge of contemporary capitalism.

Words of Caution

In encouraging our students to think about reform, we need to be particularly careful about two aspects. First, our objective is not to make the students think that all that is required to transcend the crisis is global-level planning about which only a global elite should decide. We should clearly explain to the students the nature of the current linkages between global and local affairs, that reform at one level now requires reform at the other level, and that the implementation of such reforms requires consensus building at both levels. Because most planning students will probably work at the local level — i.e., at the city or regional level — it is important that we provide them a conceptual framework to "think globally" and yet "act locally" in devising specific reform measures. They must also be constantly reminded that for any reform to be successfully implemented, broad-based local support is essential. How such support can be generated is as important an issue as the type of reform the students may think of. We need to emphasize that all along. A discussion of the American democratic process of decision making may be useful in this matter. As students are asked to compare the decision-making process in their countries with that of the U.S., they may begin to question the nature of the state-society relationship in nondemocratic governments. What will emerge from such discussions will be a higher level of sensitivity among the students about the normative aspects of state-society relationships — an issue that is at the heart of the planning profession.

The second aspect we must be careful about is not to encourage a statist mentality among the students. They
should not be led to think that government intervention is the panacea for the current crisis. Instead, they must realistically assess the limits of state involvement under the current circumstances, and search for possibilities to involve market forces and the civil society in devising solutions. Again, an awareness of this nature of the limits and possibilities of state activity can be cultivated quite well by highlighting the contrast of extensive public planning in most poor countries and the relative absence of it in the U.S. Myrdal (1957) had noted this apparent contrast when he studied poor nations in Asia after completing his research on the problems of American blacks. He wrote about it as a paradox: there was too much planning in poor countries with too little institutional capacity to plan and implement; and conversely, too little planning in countries such as the U.S., with more than adequate resources and well-established public institutions. The discovery of such paradoxes can be a learning experience for both American and international students. They may then begin to be more critical of their countries' planning/nonplanning experience. An indirect benefit of this critical inquiry will be a better understanding of how historical circumstances have shaped social decisions — to plan comprehensively in poor nations, and not to plan in the U.S. This kind of historical understanding will help the students appreciate that social decisions are time-bound. As a result, they may then be able to appreciate why there is a need to rethink the role of planning under the present circumstances.

A critical discourse of this nature, involving students from all over the world, is likely to provide an additional benefit: it can, if properly guided, contribute to a more definite and clearly articulated definition of a worldwide professional philosophy. The need for such a philosophy, which would serve as the basis for a common ethic, a core of shared ideology, a shared sense of mission, and a common culture, has been noted by American planners for many years (Perloff 1985c; Dyckman 1978; Lim 1986; Susskind 1984). Perhaps a comparison of domestic planning experiences within an international framework would provide that sense of identity for American planners as well as other planners from around the globe. The students may discover what is generally valid and generally applicable in the field of planning as they collectively search for answers to questions such as What is the scope of planning in capitalist societies? How is the state's capacity to plan shaped by internal and external forces? Are planning styles a function of the planner's relative autonomy from forces within and outside the bureaucracy? Without such a collective understanding based on a reasonable degree of consensus, planning can hardly be called a profession and will continue to lose credibility in a rapidly changing world.

There is, of course, no certainty that a cross-national approach to planning education will lead to the discovery of a universal planning doctrine. Some have even argued that such a search for general principles and a professional philosophy may be fruitless, considering the diversity of planning tasks and institutional arrangements within which planners operate (Mandelbaum 1979). I disagree because the benefit of the process lies as much in understanding what Rodwin (1986) has called "the limits of truth" as in arriving at general planning principles. In a world where "the truth" of how to develop and plan (or not plan) has so far flowed unidirectionally from the rich to the poor nations, a consensus about the limits of such truth may be quite an appropriate way to begin collective rethinking about how to face the current problems.

It is appropriate, then, that American planning schools should begin to reorient planning education to respond to the emerging global trends. If that sounds like an unrealistic and unprecedented demand, it is not so. The evolutionary history of American planning education indicates a gradual expansion of intellectual focus, from preoccupation with beautifying projects to community-level planning, followed by city planning, and eventually to regional planning (Perloff 1985a). It is time to expand the focus further by taking into account national and international factors that are likely to have a far-reaching influence on planning. This is not so much a question of looking into the future as it is a question of not overlooking fairly well-established trends on the horizon. American planning schools must begin to acknowledge these trends and anticipate the need for new knowledge and methods. Otherwise, as in the past, planning education will only follow somewhat haltingly after the march of practical events (Perloff 1985b). In other words, instead of shaping the future, which should be the objective of education, it will merely react to the changing circumstances.

Mutual Learning

The search for new types of knowledge and thinking to shape the future requires that American and international students be brought together — not on unequal terms, as in the past, but as equal partners in a mutual learning process. This position is unlikely to be contested on principle, because mutual learning is one of those ideals that cannot be argued against for diplomatic reasons. In practice, however, the changing of planning education to an explicitly mutual learning model may face stiff resistance because of the long history of intellectually asymmetrical relationships between the rich and poor nations. "What can American planners learn from the poor countries?" the skeptics are likely to argue, pointing out the lack of research that may provide evidence to the contrary.

That the poor nations' planning problems and experiences may not be of any use to America is not, however, a correct notion. There are instances of knowledge
transfer, primarily about planning principles, from the poor to rich nations. The agents of these transfers were the professionals who served as Western advisors to the poor countries during the 1950s and 1960s, but later returned to their home countries, often educated and humbled by their field experiences abroad. Though some of these development agents returned with the notion that planning in poor countries was "an entirely different ball game," a few were able to see through the apparent differences and identified common planning principles, which they then used in thinking about problems of their home countries.

Let me highlight some examples. Albert Hirschman (1981), in writing about the theory of unbalanced growth, mentioned how he formulated the underlying concepts first, during his professional work in Colombia, and later found the same principles applicable to the U.S. Reminiscing about this experience, Hirschman wrote:

As the work of Herbert Simon on "satisficing" and that of Leibenstein on "x-efficiency" were to show, the performance of advanced economies also depends not so much on finding optimal combinations for given resources as on calling forth and enlisting resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered or badly utilized — that was the way I had put it in The Strategy of Economic Development for the less developed countries. A feature I had presented as being specific to the situation of one group of economies was later found to prevail in others as well... This kind of dialectical movement first comes upon looking at outside groups, the astonished finding of otherness, and then follows the even more startling discovery that our own group is not all that different. (1981, 9)

Hirschman goes on to provide other examples of such startling discoveries. He points out that the dynamics of development with "unlimited supplies of labour," which Arthur Lewis had thought to be typical of less developed countries, have in fact prevailed in many Northern economies during the postwar period of rapid growth, primarily due to massive migration from the South. Such similarities were also observed by Gunnar Myrdal and Paul Streeten, two of the most prominent development economists of our time. Streeten (1984, 339) mentions how his work on the production function in collaboration with Myrdal showed that many of the criticisms originally developed in South Asia also apply to Western Europe and the U.S. Streeten also points out that structural theories of inflation, developed originally at the Economic Commission for Latin America by Prebisch, are now being used to analyze inflationary tendencies in the industrialized countries.

There are other equally vivid examples of learning from the poor countries, not only by economists but also by other professionals with varied backgrounds. Among planners, Friedmann's work in planning theory as well as regional development was influenced by his work experience in Venezuela, South Korea, and Chile (Friedmann 1973b). His recent work indicates that he remains convinced that "some Third World solutions apply also at home" (1986, 13). The same conviction is apparent in John Turner's work. Turner, through his years of work in Peru, had come to understand the notion of autonomy of building users. Later, he applied the same principle in advocating alternatives to American public housing policies (1976). Recently, Habraken (1985) has expanded on this theme. He has argued that incremental home building in poor countries provides an alternative architectural tradition which should replace "the hopelessly obsolescent model" of Western European architectural tradition. The architect can no longer be seen "as the maker of an exceptional product, for an exceptional occasion, and for exceptional use," as in the Western tradition, Habraken argues; and if architecture is to survive as a profession, it must learn from the poor countries, where people are engaged in the cultivation of the everyday environment, which is not static but changes and grows over time. The need to learn from the poor countries has also been stressed by Burns (1987), who has written extensively on housing problems in both rich and poor countries. Referring to the problem of growing numbers of homeless families in the U.S., Burns suggested that much can be learned from the poor countries' recent efforts to provide serviced plots to the poor, who gradually build their homes on those plots.

Another area of research that is increasingly drawing on the experience of the poor countries is the problem of the deormalization of labor in rich countries. In order to understand the increase in subcontracting and in low-paying jobs in U.S. cities, researchers have turned to the literature on the urban informal sector in the poor countries (Sassen 1984). What is more, there is some indication that in order to alleviate poverty among single-parent households in American cities, planners are now looking at successful cases of income generation among the poor in countries as remote as Bangladesh (Gould and Lyman 1987). To be sure, the transfer of policies, if it is to be successful, will require significant modification to suit the American institutional context; but that does not negate the reality that the core concepts upon which such policies are based seem to hold true in both the rich and poor countries.17

To sum up, I am proposing that if planning education is to be relevant, we must acknowledge that the times are changing and contemporary capitalism is at a crossroad; that in order to move ahead, a new global consensus of ideas is required; and that American planning schools can play a significant role in the building of such a consensus by bringing international and American students together and by fostering an intellectual
environment of mutual learning — a practice that has precedence and is becoming more prevalent. That is certainly a large objective, and will require an equally large commitment from planning educators, particularly in leading planning schools.

Epilogue

My objective in writing this article was to make a plea for a one-world approach to planning education. In making my plea, I focused entirely on the rationale for such an approach, without addressing any of the logistical questions of how to shift from the current mode of planning education to the new approach. I did not discuss what kind of resources will be required to make such a transition or whether all planning schools can muster such resources. Nor did I discuss what the format should be for one-world-oriented planning programs. Should they be based on the comparison of problem-solving experiences in rich and poor countries? And how likely are we to arrive at generalizations through such comparisons when there are wide variations among the rich and poor countries? Much has already been written about the conceptual problems of comparisons between acutely different contexts (Masser 1986; Dogan and Pelassy 1984; Harloe 1981). How should we resolve these problems? One may argue that unless such conceptual problems are resolved, it is unlikely that planning education will ever be reoriented to a one-world approach. In other words, there are critical prerequisites which must be fulfilled before we can make the transition.

My response to the prerequisite argument is the following: Yes, I acknowledge that a readjustment in the mode of planning education will not be an easy task, but the problems are likely to be resolved as we actually try to make the transition and not prior to it. The logic of this position is simple: it asserts that if a genuine commitment to the transition is supported by sincere efforts, what we now consider as prerequisites will actually be the outcome of the process. For example, methodological problems of comparative research are likely to be resolved only after we try to conduct comparative research. Similarly, the lack of planning faculty with a global perspective, which some may consider a major problem, will be resolved only after the faculty are encouraged to develop a global outlook on planning problems. To be sure, the outcome will not always be positive, and there will be some friction during the transition; but these are normal parts of all transition processes, and can be utilized as a basis for learning by doing.

Let me address another issue which follows from my plea for collapsing the First World/Third World dichotomy. One may think that I am suggesting that specialized developing areas programs which have been started lately be eliminated. On the contrary, I do not think we should begin the readjustment process by dissolving such programs, though at a later stage that may be appropriate. It is likely that by discontinuing the developing areas programs now, we may slip back to the old mold of “all-American” thinking. In the absence of an institutional base to claim resources, the poor countries’ planning concerns are likely to be swept away by the currently dominant pattern of faculty and student interests in American planning. We need to be sensitive to this existing unequal relationship, otherwise our effort to equalize the intellectual discourse may be counterproductive. That is, it may undermine even the few gains we have made so far in drawing the attention of the academic community toward the poor countries.

Where should we begin, then? There is, of course, no one correct answer, because each planning school’s response to this question will be conditioned by its unique constraints and possibilities. Some schools, of the type with emphasis solely on microlevel land-use issues, may find my proposition inappropriate for their purpose, though one can demonstrate conclusively that micro issues are rarely, if ever, independent of macro trends. Other schools, even if they agree with the rationale of this paper, may be unwilling to direct any resources towards that end in the near future. Medium-sized schools with a significant percentage of international students may begin with a new course offering focused on the local/global perspective. Still others, probably with relatively more resources, may start with a collaborative research project involving faculty and students with different geographical interests.

The shift may be more pronounced in larger schools with high percentages of international students. It may include summer programs of the type that the University of Cincinnati has been conducting in Greece (University of Cincinnati 1986), or MIT’s urban design studios in China (Richardson 1987). Recently, Columbia University’s planning program tried a different format of the same approach in Haiti, where American and international students jointly analyzed planning problems (Downs and Voltaire 1987). It is possible that once such small experiments prove to be useful, some planning schools may structure a set of courses leading toward a professional degree in comparative development planning. Seers (1979) has argued that in the future the demands for students with comparative backgrounds is likely to increase sharply, as both private firms and public institutions will require employees to function in the inherently volatile and competitive environments produced by a global economy.

One last reminder: whatever form a planning school uses to encourage cross-national teaching and research, the basic objective should be to help build a global consensus about development and planning through a mutual learning process. That, we must remember, requires a genuine and equitable exchange of ideas, not the type of relationship that Helleiner (1979) has called
"the latest wrinkle on the old international division of labor": the flow of information, as the new raw material, from the South to the North, and its eventual return to its origin as a manufactured product, analyzed and interpreted by the North. The way to break out of this division of labor is not to discourage the study of poor countries by citizens of rich countries but to encourage the study of each by the other. Streuten (1974) proposed more than a decade ago that such research on American domestic issues by foreign students and scholars be given top priority in research funding. Though Streuten’s advice has yet to influence mainstream thinking, particularly among economists, there is indication that some planners have come to the same conclusion. For example, Kaufman’s (1985) comparative evaluation of American and Israeli planners reflects this new mode of thinking. Kaufman’s study points out that Israeli planners have a broader conception than American planners have of what constitutes ethical issues in planning, and that Israeli planners have a stronger normative drive than their counterparts in America. Such findings can be very useful in generating the type of dialogue that should serve as the basis for mutual learning. In the process, we will be able to transcend the current relationship between knowledge producers and knowledge consumers and, instead, as Hudson (1976) suggested, create a knowledge network at the global level—a network which will play a leading role in shaping the future according to our collective needs at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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**Notes**

1. According to Hansen (1985), the proportion of foreign students had increased from under 10 percent in 1975 to over 20 percent in the early 1980s. Between 1977 and 1982, in 59 planning schools, total enrollment dropped by 13 percent, while domestic student enrollment dropped by 22 percent and foreign student enrollment increased by 61 percent (pp. 5-6). The rate of increase in foreign student enrollment has leveled off lately.

2. Wheaton wrote, “I have often wondered what would happen if we provided each of our returning graduates with $100,000 in equity capital and suggested that he go into the home building business on the side. I can’t believe that we wouldn’t have today a dozen millionaires in a dozen countries, each swinging a lot of political weight in his native country, each a powerful force for the better organization of development activity” (1968, 128).

3. For example, MIT, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, and University of Cincinnati.

4. The journal Economic Development and Cultural Change, first produced in 1952 by B. F. Hoselitz, played a leading role in propagating the view that cultural change was a prerequisite for economic development.

5. Even prior to Development Economics, there used to be a course, called “Colonial Economics,” which focused on ways to “stabilize” (as opposed to “develop”) the economies of poor countries (Seers 1979).

6. One of the most influential studies with regard to this issue was by Albert Fishlow (1972), who showed that income inequality in Brazil had increased despite unprecedented growth of the national economy.

7. Gunnar Myrdal had raised this issue with economists much earlier when he wrote, “In this epoch of great awakening, it would be pathetic if the young economists in the underdeveloped countries got caught in the predictions of the economic thinking in the advanced countries... I would, instead, wish them to have the courage to throw away large structures of meaningless, irrelevant, and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrine and theoretical approaches and to start their thinking afresh from a study of their own needs and problems” (1957, 103-104).

8. During this time, the World Bank produced a modified version of the earlier development theory in a book entitled Redistribution With Growth (Chenery et al. 1974). This provided somewhat of a rallying ground for a few, but it lacked the intellectual consistency and popular optimism to recreate the lost consensus about development.

9. Fisher has identified the following six reasons why students from poor nations come to the U.S.: (1) to attain technical expertise, (2) to gain opportunities for personal growth, (3) to achieve professional certification and promotion when they return home, (4) to receive higher income and status, (5) to enjoy temporary relief from burdensome responsibilities, and (6) to seek opportunities for emigration (1981, 294).

10. Who is to blame for the common problems? It used to be common, until the recent stock market crash, to blame the poor countries for creating a debt problem, which, the critics proposed, severely affected the global economy. It has also been rather popular to trace the origin of the common crisis to the first oil price hike by OPEC. However, as Abdalla (1980) and others have shown, the origin of the common crisis can be traced back to 1971 when the convertibility of the dollar — the international reserve currency — to gold was suspended by President Nixon. Since then, many events have further deepened the vulnerability of the global system of finance, trade, and monetary arrangements, namely, the oil price hike; the change of the monetary system from fixed to floating exchange rates; the sharp drop in the international price of primary products that are the main exports of poor nations; the rise of interest rates in the U.S. and the concurrent rise in U.S. budget deficits, and so on (Helleiner 1983; Dell 1982).

11. On this issue, the New York Times had an editorial that began on the following note: “The most contentious issue in New York City is probably not capital punishment or abortion but street vendors” (1 December 1986 A20).

12. One may disagree with this broad generalization by pointing out the various attempts at “privatization” and other managerial mechanisms that are currently being used in the rich as well as the poor countries to reduce state expenditures and generate new sources of revenue. These measures are based on a notion that the current crisis is primarily the result of bureaucratic mismanagement rather than a manifestation of deeper structural problems. Such measures are unlikely to improve the quality of city life (Szelenyi 1984; Sanjay 1986).

13. There are indications that the “left” is modifying its position on this issue (see Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985).

14. This can be explained by the fact that very few students with training in historical analysis apply for admission to planning programs. And those who apply are not given priority in the admission process over students trained in economics, architecture, or sociology. Historical analysis is also not stressed in planning curricula. It is regarded as a “soft” method compared to computer-
aided positivistic analysis that provides a scientific aura, and hence respectability, to what in many cases is rather useless for effective practice.

15. Conflict resolution and negotiation is becoming increasingly central to the planning profession (see Susskind and Ozawa 1984).

16. Sternlieb made a similar observation in a recent article when he wrote, “The growing awareness of international change provides a mirror to American planners, not so much for an increasingly sophisticated look at others, but rather for a compelling look at ourselves” (1987, 23).

17. For example, that poor families are credit worthy, and often have a better loan repayment rate than the relatively better off, is true for both rich and poor nations. Similarly, the positive impact of “solidarity groups” among poor families is also true in both contexts.

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